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THE RELIGION CLAUSES AND THE
BURGER COURT*
Philip B. Kurland **
Pope John Paul II, at a Vatican conference marking the twentieth anni-
versary of Pope John XXIII's encyclical "Pacem in Terris," said: "Among
the rights of man one rightly places the right to religious freedom; this is in
fact the most fundamental." Surely it is that freedom of the mind, including
freedom of conscience, that marks the distinction between those countries
where man is free and all the others. No one in our time has symbolized this
freedom more than Pope John XXIII. For one who is not a member of the
Faith, it is indeed a great honor for me to deliver the lecture that bears his
name. Unworthy as they may be, I offer these remarks by way of homage.
And to borrow words of Judge Learned Hand from a different context, as I
am wont to do: "I thank you in the name of that homage which all of us
owe. . . to the memory of one who was foresighted and temperate and wise
and just."'
Freedom of religion was encapsulated in the words of the first amendment
to our Constitution, which reads: "Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."2 The
words were composed against a history in which England and most of the
states maintained an established church, where a government acknowledged
one true form of belief, incorporated that belief, more or less, into its civil
laws, provided that church with its sustenance, usually by way of taxation of
all inhabitants, and allowed for government participation in the rule of the
church and for church participation in the rule of government. All of this is
possible where a single religion or sect represents the vast majority of the
people or of the ruling class.
Some American states maintained established churches through the first
third of the nineteenth century. The amalgam of the thirteen states into one
nation meant the absence of any majority denomination in the larger polity.
* This address was delivered as the annual Pope John XXIII Lecture at the Columbus
School of Law, The Catholic University of America on March 29, 1984.
** William R. Kenan, Jr. Distinguished Service Professor, University of Chicago; A.B.,
1942, University of Pennsylvania; LL.B., 1944, Harvard University.
1. L. HAND, THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 200 (1952).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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Those majorities within each state, for example the Congregationalists in
New England or the Church of England in Virginia, were not prepared to
subordinate their preferred positions within their states to whatever group
might possibly emerge as a majority in the nation. In any event, by the time
of the formation of the new nation, there was such a multitude of sects and
beliefs, it was unlikely that any one could attain the popularity necessary to
support an established church within the nation. Massachusetts was the last
state finally to abandon establishment in 1833.
This is not to say that the original states were not frequently blessed with
a degree of toleration that far exceeded what was known anywhere in Eu-
rope and certainly in England. It cannot be forgotten that a very large
number of our original settlers-not to speak of the generations of immi-
grants who came to these shores after them-were here to escape the reli-
gious intolerance of their native lands, whether Calvinists or Catholics,
Baptists or Methodists, or the multitudes of smaller religious groups whose
religious beliefs subjected them to persecution. Thus, even before the fram-
ing of the Constitution, the Continental Congress provided in the very first
article of the Ordinance of 1787 for the Government of the Northwest Terri-
tory that: "No person demeaning himself in a peaceable and orderly man-
ner, shall ever be molested on account of his mode of worship or religious
sentiments, in the said territory."' 3 Compare this with Oliver Cromwell's
declaration of what he meant by religious toleration, when he said: "As to
freedom of conscience, I meddle with no man's conscience; but if you mean
by that liberty to celebrate the Mass, I would have you understand that in no
place where the power of Parliament of England prevails shall that be
permitted."4
Most of the American colonies and states made provision in their funda-
mental laws for religious tolerance that was certainly a good deal more lib-
eral than Cromwell's. Freedom of conscience and freedom of worship were
both usually guaranteed. Some, however, confined these rights to Protestant
sects-as would most of the great so-called "liberal" English writings on the
subject--others only to Christians. Almost nowhere were all inhabitants,
regardless of religious belief, entitled to full and equal participation in gov-
ernmental affairs or governmental benefits or protections. Indeed, even at
the time of the adoption of the Constitution, many were aghast at the provi-
sion in article VI that "no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualifica-
tion to any Office or Public Trust under the United States."5
3. U.S. CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, ORDINANCE OF 1787, art. I.
4. McDaniel v. Patty, 435 U.S. 618, 631 n.2 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring).
5. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 3.
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Religious toleration, admittedll growing even in England, was not to be
equated with religious freedom. Religious tolerance was, in effect, a leave
granted by a religious majority to a religious minority to practice some or all
of its religious beliefs. Religious freedom must mean that one's obligations
to his Creator is a matter between him and his God; it requires no man's
leave. Religious freedom must mean that whatever special place one religion
may have in the eyes of God, all religions are equal in the eyes of the law.
The forceful argument for religious freedom was not that truth would nec-
essarily emerge from free expression of diversity of beliefs and views. It was
rather that the alliance between religion and government had always re-
sulted in bloody divisiveness within a nation and bloody wars between na-
tions. The "first new nation," the United States of America, could afford
neither if it was to survive as a free nation, a survival about which we can be
more sanguine now than its people could be in 1789.
The equality that is a predicate for religious freedom is more obviously an
ingredient in requiring nonestablishment. But the arguments against estab-
lishment, most of which derived from the history of the colonies and the new
states, tended to be put in one of two alternative ways. Separation was re-
quired, according to Roger Williams' teachings, lest the mission of the
church be perverted by the goals of the state.6 Williams never descended to
the locution that he who pays the piper calls the tune, a proposition that we
have certainly learned the hard way, but it was not irrelevant to his desire to
keep the civil government out of the management of his church. The
Virginians, with Jefferson and Madison as their most cogent spokesmen,
were also of the view that religious freedom required nonestablishment.
Their expressed concern was to keep civil government from being perverted
to the ends of a Church. (I have often speculated that the Virginians were
Francophiles, a view hardly congenial to the hierarchy of the Church of
England.) In any event, the preacher Williams was asking government to
keep its nose out of his affairs, while the Virginia politicians made a similar
appeal to the clerics to mind their own business.
Some today will find it strange that it is to the separation of church and
state that deTocqueville attributed the survival of a strong spirit of religion
in the United States when he visited this country in the 1830s. In Democracy
in America, he wrote:
My desire to discover the causes of this phenomenon [that is, the
strong hold of religion on the people] increased from day to day.
In order to satisfy it I questioned the members of all the different
sects; I sought especially the society of the clergy, who are the de-
6. A. DETOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (Bradley ed. 1945).
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positaries of different creeds and are especially interested in their
duration. As a member of the Roman Catholic Church, I was
more particularly brought into contact with several of its priests,
with whom I became intimately acquainted. To each of these men
I expressed my astonishment and explained my doubts. I found
that they differed upon matters of detail alone, and that they all
attributed the peaceful dominion of religion in their country
mainly to the separation of church and state. I do not hesitate to
affirm that during my stay in America I did not meet a single indi-
vidual, of the clergy or the laity, who was not of the same opinion
on this point.7
This separation of church and state could not be attributed to the first
amendment. It will be recalled that, although Madison's earlier draft of the
amendment had proposed to make it applicable to the states as well as to the
national government, in terms the first amendment, like all provisions of the
Bill of Rights, was a restraint on the national government alone. The first
amendment became applicable to the states by way of the fourteenth and
then not through explication of its legislative history or the intent of its au-
thors. Instead, the amendment's applicability to the states came by way of
legerdemain of the Supreme Court, who found license in their commissions
to rewrite the Constitution better to their own liking. It is probably much
too late to challenge the legitimacy of the application of the religion clauses
of the first amendment to the states. But it may be recalled that when,
shortly after the promulgation of the fourteenth amendment, another
amendment to the Constitution, the so-called Blaine Amendment, was pro-
posed specifically to make the religion clauses applicable to the states, it
failed of adoption.
Even so, the religion clauses of the first amendment did not emerge from
the cocoon of the fourteenth until well into the twentieth century. When
they did, they were treated as separate commands, one relating to freedom
and the other to establishment or, as it has become better known, separation.
The Establishment Clause was made part of the fourteenth amendment in
1947, in Everson v. Board of Education.' The Court held that a state may
pay for public transportation of a parochial school student even if it paid for
that of no one else. That the argument in the opinion of the Court, did not
sustain the result, did not diminish the effective enlargement of the four-
teenth amendment. Mr. Justice Black, writing for the Court, all but incor-
porated Madison's Remonstrances9 as an explanation of its meaning. The
7. Id. at 308.
8. 330 U.S. 1 (1946).
9. Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, II THE WRIT-
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free exercise clause was applied to the states in 1940, in Cantwell v. Connecti-
cut,"0 although the Court now insists that this did not come about until 1943
in Murdock v. Pennsylvania."
Allow me to digress slightly from the straight path from the origins of the
religion clauses through their application by the Burger Court. I must re-
mind you that the function of the Constitution is to establish and to limit the
powers of government. The body of the Constitution was meant to establish
a government for a free people, a self-government in which "[w]e, the peo-
ple" were to be sovereign. The government was established to serve the peo-
ple, not the people the government. Such a government had to be based
largely on majority rule. But its creators knew well that majorities, too,
could be oppressive and that safeguards for minorities, even minorities of
one, were also necessary. The Bill of Rights was largely a series of restraints
against majority imposition on minorities, written mostly in terms of assur-
ing procedures that would guarantee the rule of law, that the arbitrary
whims of officials would not be invoked. The concern of the Bill of Rights
was freedom of individuals. The concern of the religion clauses was also the
individual and not the church of which he may be a member. Churches
receive protection only in order that their parishioners be free of government
restraint, not the other way around.
It must be remembered, too, however, that when the Bill of Rights was
written, the role of government in the lives of the people was expected to be a
limited one. Its primary functions were to protect the lives, the liberties, and
the properties of individuals against invasion by other individuals at home
and from depredations by foreign governments from abroad. The greatest
problem was to assure a government strong enough to ensure these protec-
tions but not so strong as to itself constitute a threat to the life, liberty, and
property of its citizenry. This was to be an experiment in a new order of
things, a "novus ordo seclorum" as the Great Seal has it.
The experiment has been more or less a successful one, although govern-
ment has expanded its role to the point where it has invaded our lives to a
degree that most of the Founding Fathers could not possibly have foreseen.
(Perhaps the greatest fears of our constitution writers that carries over to
modern times was their worry about a large military establishment beyond
civilian control.) The one area that must remain sacrosanct if freedom is to
be preserved is the life of the mind. The life of the mind, including freedom
INGS OF JAMES MADISON 183-91 (G. Hunt ed. 1901), reprinted in Everson, 330 U.S. at 63-72
(Rutledge, J., dissenting).
10. 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
11. 319 U.S. 105 (1943); see Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 760 n.8
(1973).
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of conscience and freedom of thought, and freedom to communicate ideas,
calls for greater and greater protection against pragmatic demands for sacri-
fice of individual values to societal ends.
I repeat, the Bill of Rights does not purport to limit individual actions,
only governmental ones. This explains why the religion clauses may be
deemed to have been successful despite the fact that our national history is
rife with evidence of religious bigotry and intolerance. American govern-
ment has itself seldom sought directly to curtail religious freedom. The per-
secution of the Mormons, both by the national government, with the aid of
the Supreme Court, and the State of Illinois, is probably the one big blot on
our escutcheon here. But organized anti-religious sentiments outside of gov-
ernment have been only too frequent. Thus, for example, I would remind
you that the tenets of the Ku Klux Klan were as anti-Catholic and anti-
Semitic as anti-black. In the 1850s a national party, self-labeled the Ameri-
can Party but more generally called the "Know-Nothings," was largely suc-
cessful on a platform of anti-Catholic and anti-immigration policies. The
number of smaller groups with similar activities at their core is unfortu-
nately legion. Certainly one of the hurdles that Al Smith could not over-
come in his 1928 presidential campaign was his religious affiliation and it
was no small concern to John Kennedy in his 1960 bid for the presidency.
My only point here is that the Bill of Rights does not itself reach this kind of
religious prejudice. Article VI and the first amendment were meant to pre-
vent the government from sinking to the depths of religious intolerance that
we are not yet prepared to deny to individuals. Perhaps the only cure for
societal ills of this kind is that proposed by Mr. Justice Holmes, that we
"grow more civilized."' 12
I took this digression for two reasons. First, to show the nature of the
constitutional limitations with which we are concerned, that is, limitation on
government, not private citizens. Second, to recognize that against the
world's history of government persecution of religious minorities, such as
may now be seen at work in Iran for example, the issues of government and
religion that come before our courts may seem picayune to many of us. In-
deed, they may be more important as symbols than for pragmatic reasons.
But, as Holmes also told us, "We live by symbols, and what shall be symbol-
ized by any image of the sight depends upon the mind of him who sees it."' 3
Besides, that which seems unimportant to some of us may take on great
significance to those involved in the controversy. And this is not less the fact
where emotion rather than reason is involved. For example, we have the
12. Holmes, SPEECHES 102 (1913).
13. Holmes, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 270 (1920).
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Burger Court's decision that the State of New Hampshire may not punish a
man for defacing his license plate to remove the motto thereon: "Live free
or Die," which offended the religious sensibilities of the car owner.' 4 Re-
member what Mr. Justice Jackson said when he sustained the right not to
have to salute the flag, not only for religious reasons but for any conscien-
tious ones: "We can have intellectual individualism and the rich cultural
diversities that we owe to exceptional minds only at the price of occasional
eccentricity and abnormal attitudes."' 5
Hyperbole tends to mark the commentary on church-state issues, whether
that commentary comes from the pulpits, the press, or the halls of academe,
all of which are guaranteed freedom of expression by the first amendment
and none of which are saddled with any responsibility beyond self-restraint.
The typical charge against the school prayer cases was that they removed
God from the classrooms. No amount of reason is an acceptable response.
The op-ed page of The New York Times featured a piece by Professor Nor-
man Redlich headlined "Nativity Ruling Insults Jews."' 16 My own view is
that the opinion bordered on heresy, but I shall say more of this later.
Let me return to the Supreme Court's path to the Burger Court decisions
in the church-state area. Between the time of the incorporation of the reli-
gion clauses of the first amendment into the fourteenth amendment by the
Court in the 1940s and the accession to the Chief Justiceship of Warren Earl
Burger, the Court became heavily involved in church-state cases. On the
whole, the Court followed the line of Mr. Justice Black's argument in Ever-
son-the school bus case-rather than his judgment. His oft-quoted lan-
guage, adopting Jefferson's "wall of separation" rather than Roger Williams'
argument for noninterference, was this (for a while it was the talisman for
the Court's actions in this area):
The 'establishment of religion' clause of the First Amendment
means at least this. Neither a state nor the Federal Government
can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion,
aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither can
force nor influence a person to go to or remain away from church
against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any
religion. No person can be punished for entertaining or professing
religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attend-
ance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to sup-
port any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be
called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice reli-
14. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
15. Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641-42 (1943).
16. N.Y. Times, Mar. 24, 1984, at 21, col. 2.
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gion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or
secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or
groups or vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause against
establishment of religion by law was intended to erect 'a wall of
separation between church and state.'17
Most of the pre-Burger Court's more difficult problems in this arena, like
those of the Burger Court itself, centered on the issue of religion in the pub-
lic schools and public aid to private religious schools. After Everson, the
Court first held an Illinois law invalid that permitted students who opted for
religious instruction by nonpublic school teachers on the school premises to
attend those classes in lieu of their public school classes. 18 Whether the ba-
sis of the decision was the use of the compulsory education laws to supply
the students for the religious classes, the coercive influence on the students
who did not attend and had to mark the time during the absence of their
fellow students, or the stigma of declaring oneself a nonbeliever or heretic,
was never clearly delineated by the Court. The public furor against the
Court was enormous. The Court retreated as soon as it had the opportunity
to do so. In a New York case, where the same facts existed except that the
religious instruction was to be offered off the school premises, the Court sus-
tained the validity of the released time concept. 19 It was merely an "accom-
modation" which the State could graciously make to its religious
constituents. The alternative "accommodation," of releasing everyone for
an hour at the end of one of the school days, was not acceptable to the
churches involved, for fear that if students were given a choice between ex-
cuse from school and attendance at catechism classes, there would be no
attendance at the classes. That the Court had flip-flopped was evident to all,
suggesting that even Supreme Court Justices could be brought to recognize
the force of public opinion.
The school prayer cases brought even more opprobrium on the Court
when it decided first that the Board of Regents of New York could not com-
pose a nondenominational prayer with which the school day must be
opened2" and later that prayers to be selected by students or faculty from
recognized religious texts could not be required, even where those not wish-
ing to participate were excused.2 ' Many church groups that had opposed
any prayers except those of their own faith had come around to the idea that
any prayer was better than none. But the issue had long disturbed the courts
17. Everson, 330 U.S. at 15-16.
18. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
19. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
20. Engle v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
21. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
[Vol. 34:1
Religion Clauses
even before the Supreme Court entered the fray. Typical of such controver-
sies was that brought by Catholic parents in Illinois where they successfully
enjoined the reading of the King James Bible, the singing of hymns, and the
recitation of the Lord's Prayer.22 The Illinois Supreme Court may have put
the point better than did the United States Supreme Court when in Ring v.
Board of Education in 1910, it said:
The exclusion of a pupil from this part of school exercises in which
the rest of the school joins, separates him from his fellows, puts
him in a class by himself, deprives him of his equality with the
other pupils, subjects him to religious stigma and places him at a
disadvantage in the school, which the law never contemplated. All
this is because of his religious belief. If the instruction or exercise
is such that certain pupils must be excused from it because it is
hostile to their or their parents religious beliefs, then such instruc-
tion or exercise is sectarian and forbidden by the constitution.23
Thus, when President Reagan grew up in Illinois, it was unconstitutional
under the state constitution to conduct school prayers in the public schools,
at least where any students took exception to it. The fact was, as the Presi-
dent has testified, that school prayers were the order of the day in his class-
rooms. So, too, after the United States Supreme Court opinions, school
prayer remained the rule rather than the exception in most jurisdictions
where no one was sufficiently offended to take legal action against it. We
tend to forget these days that a judgment is not a statute, that it binds only
those who are parties to it, however much it establishes a precedent for later
suits. Nonetheless, a movement to cancel the decisions by constitutional
amendment quickly came into existence and is still going strong, although it
was slowed down when its supporters failed to muster the necessary two-
thirds vote in the Senate to initiate such an amendment. The difficulty is in
finding a formula that would avoid coercing acquiescence or stigmatizing
nonbelievers. It was in the second flag salute case that Mr. Justice Jackson
asserted: "If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is
that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in poli-
tics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to
confess by word or act their faith therein."'24 It is that "fixed star" that is
put in jeopardy by the proposed amendment.
Here is the creed of liberty that was encompassed in the Bill of Rights.
The individual is free and supreme, subject to majority rule in those areas
where the majority is authorized to rule, but not in regard to matters of
22. Ring v. Board of Educ., 245 I11. 334, 92 N.E. 251 (1910).
23. Id. at 351, 92 N.E. at 256.
24. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642.
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faith, or speech, or ideas, unless the practice of that speech or ideas or faith
does specific injury to another. There is a duty of the individual to society,
but that did not include an obligation to submit to compulsion of thought.
That is what freedom of religion is all about. As Jackson concluded in that
same opinion: "[F]reedom to differ is not limited to things that do not mat-
ter much. That would be a mere shadow of freedom. The test of its sub-
stance is the right to differ as to things that touch the heart of the existing
order.
,
'25
The school prayer issue has not been back to the Supreme Court. Predic-
tions about judicial behavior are always risky at best. But if the trend that
the Burger Court has begun were to continue, I should not be surprised if
the Court would one day soon obviate the need for a constitutional amend-
ment. The Court has become very much a majoritarian institution. Only
recently the Burger Court, in Widmer v. Vincente,26 held that a state univer-
sity could not deny access to its facilities to a student group seeking to use
them for religious discussion and workshops, where other student groups
were allowed such access. The ruling would seem impeccable, except for
what the Court chose to ignore, over Mr. Justice White's dissent, that the
religious group sought the use of the state's facilities not merely for discus-
sion and fellowship but for the conduct of religious worship services. It
wanted to use them, and did use them, as a church. The notion of equal
clubhouse rights for religious and nonreligious organizations takes on a dif-
ferent visage when it is not a clubroom but a chapel that is in issue. But the
precedent is now there.
We must note, however, that the opinion may rest on a different judicial
classification, one that could explain several apparent discrepancies in its
rulings but is seldom made evident or even stated sotto voce. The doctrine of
separation has been applied with more vigor where the school population
involved has been grammar or high school students, rather than college or
university students, or adults in noneducational settings. Whether the Wid-
mer v. Vincente ruling will apply to lower level schools, where the students
are regarded as more susceptible to impregnation of religious beliefs, is cer-
tainly not clear.
Public assistance to private schools is the other large category of church-
state cases that have engaged the Court. Here we have a hodge-podge of
decisions beginning before the Burger Court but much exaggerated by the
Court. If the description I am about to give you sounds like it derived from
Alice's Adventures in Wonderland, please believe that I have attempted as
25. Id.
26. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
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honest a summary as I am capable of giving you. Thus, a government pre-
sumably may supply the cost of transportation to religious school students.2 7
It may also make available to parochial school students the same textbooks
it supplies for its own school. 28 It may not afford reimbursement for testing
in church schools, if the tests are created and administered by parochial
school teachers, but it may do so if the tests are state-created.29 So, too, may
the state provide funds for "diagnostic speech and hearing services and diag-
nostic psychological services," as well as "physician, nursing, dental and op-
tometric services in nonpublic schools." 3  Government supply of
"therapeutic services" off the school premises does not violate the Establish-
ment Clause, but the provision of such services on school premises does.3"
I continue the litany of United States Supreme Court decisions in this
area. If government may supply school texts, it may not supply other in-
structional materials, even when they are "incapable of diversion to religious
use."3 2 Funding for school field trips is invalid, although it provides only
transportation costs, because field trips are an integral part of the
curriculum.3 3
When it comes to providing public funds to a religious school, or its stu-
dents or their parents, the restrictions have been rather stiff. Monies cannot
be supplied even for such purely secular purposes as maintenance and re-
pairs of buildings.3 4 "In view of the impossibility of separating the secular
educational function from the sectarian, the state aid inevitably flows in part
in support of the religious role of the schools.",35 Last year, however, all this
restraint on parental reimbursement for parochial school expenses or tax de-
ductions seems to have been quietly and yet firmly removed. Or, at the very
least, the demolition of the no-aid structure was begun.
In Mueller v. Allen,36 a Minnesota statute allowed state taxpayers to de-
duct expenses for tuition, textbooks, and transportation for their children
attending an elementary or secondary school. The decision rested on the
ground that the benefits conferred by the state did not flow directly to the
27. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 1.
28. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
29. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ., 413 U.S.
472 (1973).
30. See Wolman, 433 U.S. at 242.
31. See id. at 248-51.
32. Id. at 248; see Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 756 (tax credits for educational expenses violates
the Establishment Clause).
33. See Wolman, 433 U.S. at 252-55.
34. See Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 774-80.
35. Wolman, 433 U.S. at 250.
36. 103 S. Ct. 3062 (1983).
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parochial schools but only indirectly and then at the choice of the parents.
The Court divided five-to-four, with Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun,
and Stevens in dissent. The majority purported to distinguish rather than
overrule Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist,37 decided ten years ear-
lier, where tax credits of a similar nature were held to violate the Establish-
ment Clause. The distinctions, however, were formal rather than real. Both
schemes were for the purpose of assisting financing of parochial school edu-
cation. The Court might have faced the real issue by recognizing that paro-
chial schools, under the regulation of state laws, are required to provide a
secular education along with their religious functions. In so doing, they are
engaged in a function that all state constitutions impose on state govern-
ments. If this is not sufficient justification for state contributions to paro-
chial school education, because of the Establishment Clause, then the
various evasions of the limitation should fare no better. If indirect means
may be utilized to the forbidden end, which is what the Court said in Muel-
ler, it surely would be more wholesome to acknowledge the validity of the
objective than to cover it over by sophistical reasoning of the sort used in
Mueller. There are probably only five lawyers in the country-the members
of the Supreme Court majority-if that many, who do not see Mueller as a
radical departure from the past. Whether it is a desirable change would
surely evoke greater controversy.
Meanwhile, the Court has uniformly upheld grants to church-affiliated in-
stitutions of higher learning so long as the moneys were not directly used for
religious training. Whether this is because educational institutions at this
level are not regarded as arms of the church or because students of these
ages are not regarded as subject to religious indoctrination, the Court has
not really bothered to tell us.
The creche case, Lynch v. Donnelly,39 of recent notoriety, was even more
disingenuous in reaching a dubious goal for unexpressed reasons. The Court
was again divided five-to-four, with the same Justices dissenting as in Muel-
ler. The question was whether the City of Pawtucket, Rhode Island, by er-
ecting a Nativity Scene in a privately owned but publicly accessed park,
violated the Establishment Clause of the first amendment. The Court said
that this was no more of a breach of the Constitution than the Santa Claus,
the Christmas tree, a banner reading "Seasons Greetings," and the singing of
carols which accompanied it.' It was, said the Court, an accommodation to
37. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
38. Roemer v. Board of Public Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S.
734 (1973); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
39. 104 S. Ct. 1355 (1984).
40. Id. at 1365.
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majority religious sentiment, like chaplains in the state legislatures, on which
it had put its imprimatur only the previous term in Marsh v. Chambers.41
As Mr. Justice Brennan wrote in the legislative chaplain case:
The Court makes no pretense of subjecting Nebraska's practice
of legislative prayer to any of the formal 'tests' that have tradition-
ally structured our inquiry under the Establishsment Clause. That
it fails to do so is, in a sense, a good thing, for it simply confirms
that the Court is carving out an exception to the Establishment
Clause rather than reshaping Establishment Clause doctrine to ac-
commodate legislative prayer.42
The legislative chaplain case was at least straightforward. Its primary jus-
tification was its long undisturbed history. The creche opinion was sleazy.
In 1980, the Court, in a per curiam opinion decided, without the necessity
for argument because the issue was so clear, that the Establishment Clause
prohibited a state from posting copies of the Ten Commandments on school-
room walls, although the posters were paid for by private funds. The
Court's opinion read, in part:
The pre-eminent purpose for posting the Ten Commandments
on schoolroom walls is plainly religious in nature. The Ten Com-
mandments are undeniably a sacred text in the Jewish and Chris-
tian faiths, and no legislative recitation of supposed secular
purposes can blind us to that fact. . . . It does not matter that the
posted copies of the Ten Commandments are financed by volun-
tary contributions, for the mere posting of the copies under the
auspices of the legislature provides the 'official support of the State
. . . Government' that the Establishment Clause prohibits ....
[I]t is no defense to urge that the religious practices here may be
relatively minor encroachments on the First Amendment.43
One might have thought that four-year old precedent sufficient to guide
the result in the creche case. But it would seem that the creche was really
only a device to attract commercial activity, a passive record of an historical
event, to be analogized to religious paintings that occupy the walls of many a
municipal museum. To suggest that the creche is unlike the Ten Command-
ments, and is not a religious symbol clearly demeans the religion of those
who erected it. If it is not put forth as illustrative of God's miracle, it is
surely not merely the portrayal of the birth of any child in Bethlehem two
millenia ago. Such treatment of the creche symbol further detracts from the
religious significance of the Christmas holiday, a holiday which every year,
41. 103 S. Ct. 3300 (1983).
42. Id. at 3338.
43. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41-42 (1980) (footnote omitted).
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at least in this country, pays more homage to Mammon than to God. I
would think that devout Christians might take umbrage at the government,
in the form of the judiciary, for labeling a depiction of the birth of the Christ
child as a nonreligious symbol, like a Christmas tree or a banner proclaiming
"Seasons Greetings." (I must say that I would have felt surer of my conclu-
sions had I not read in the The New York Times that in the recent Polish
controversy, Cardinal Glemp said that the crucifixes that the government
was removing from the walls of an agricultural college were to be regarded
not as religious symbols but rather as symbols of nationalism. Obviously if
the crucifix itself can be regarded as a secular symbol, so too can a creche.)
Again, whether the creche case was rightly or wrongly decided, it would
seem quite inconsistent with the decision on the Ten Commandments, unless
one were again to distinguish a forum for school children from a forum for
the general public. This is a distinction frequently made but seldom
rationalized.
A review of the Burger Court's Establishment Clause cases always re-
minds me of the quatrain by that famed nineteenth century English juris-
prude, Charles Dodgson, who wrote:
'You are old, Father William,' the young man said,
'And your hair has become very white;
And yet you incessantly stand on your head-
Do you think at your age, it is right?'"
I don't think that the point I'm trying to make is that the Burger Court is
less concerned about following precedent than it should be, particularly in
this area of the law. It is rather that a survey of the Establishment Clause
cases since Burger joined the Court reveals a total revolution of the judicial
construction of that portion of the first amendment. Remember that the
incorporation of the Establishment Clause in Everson established its meaning
as complete separation of the realms of church and state. Since the Consti-
tution was directed only at government, it forbade government to enter the
arena reserved for the religious. Government was not, according to Mr. Jus-
tice Black and Jefferson and Madison, to contribute even a farthing to the
furtherance of religious affairs. This understanding certainly prevailed at the
time that the new Chief Justice donned his mantle. And it was in his very
first term that Burger doomed the strict separationist notion of the Estab-
lishment Clause, although not many recognized it at the time.
In Walz v. Tax Commission,4" the Court in an opinion by the Chief Jus-
tice, upheld a tax exemption granted by New York for churches and other
44. Carroll, ALICE'S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND ch. 5 (1865).
45. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
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properties of communal benefit. Douglas, adhering to the Madisonian Re-
monstrances which he published by way of Appendix, found a tax exemption
for churches no different from a subsidy.46 Burger, by statements subtle and
not so subtle, weaned the Court from the strict separationist interpretation.
He found no violation because "[w]e cannot read New York's statute as at-
tempting to establish religion; it is simply sparing the exercise of religion
from the burden of property taxation levied on private profit institutions."4 7
"There is no genuine nexus between tax exemption and establishment of reli-
gion.",48 "A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds," Emerson
once told us.49 So we may forgive the proposition put by Burger only last
term in the Bob Jones University case,5" where he said: "When the Govern-
ment grants exemptions or allows deductions all taxpayers are affected; the
very fact of the exemption or deduction for the donor means that other tax-
payers can be said to be indirect and vicarious donors."'" This was exactly
Justice Douglas' point in his dissent in Walz.
Burger did have two hundred years of history on his side as well as a
recognition of an awful fiscal and social mess if church properties suddenly
became amenable to taxation. What really was not noticed was the shift in
tone from strict separation to cooperation as the hallmark of the Establish-
ment Clause. "The State has an affirmative policy that considers these
groups [including churches] as beneficial and stabilizing influences in com-
munity life and finds this classification [for tax exemption] useful, desirable,
and in the public interest."52 What becomes clearly visible through hind-
sight is Burger's steady march toward reading the first amendment as a li-
cense for cooperation between church and state. It seems a strange reading
for those who grew up with some familiarity with the origins of the amend-
ments, with Jefferson's sonorous phrases and proud accomplishments of reli-
gious freedom for Virginia in their minds. But it is clear that between 1970
and 1983, when Burger finally had a five-judge cohort to join him, Justice
Black's Everson reading, indeed, was stood on its head. The expectation can
be that where religious groups are able to secure assistance for their endeav-
ors-although presumably still not for liturgical exercises-from legislatures
and executives, the judiciary will put no bar in the way of these beneficences.
When we turn to the Burger Court's Freedom Clause cases, we are met by
46. Id. at 710-11.
47. Id. at 673.
48. Id. at 675.
49. Emerson, Self Reliance, in ESSAYS: FIRST SERIES (1841).
50. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 2017 (1983).
51. Id. at 2028.
52. Walz, 397 U.S. at 673.
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a less revealing set of opinions. From the beginning of the Court's invoca-
tion of this constitutional proposition, its judgments have tended to be ad
hoc rather than principled. Of course, I would agree with Mr. Justice Jack-
son's statement in Barnette,5 3 that the "task of translating the majestic gen-
eralities of the Bill of Rights . . . into concrete restraints on officials dealing
with the problems of the twentieth century is one to disturb self-confi-
dence.",5 4 To say this, however, is not to negate Justice Frankfurter's propo-
sition that: "We do not sit like a kadi under a tree dispensing justice
according to considerations of individual expediency."" 5 And yet, the "ma-
jestic generalities" do, somehow, seem to emerge in translation as kadi-like
ukases.
Clearly, the central purpose of the Freedom Clause was to preclude gov-
ernment interference with an individual's choice of religious affiliation or his
form of worship. When the laws in question are not such direct infringe-
ments but rather ordinances that tangentially, if substantially, conflict with
religious precepts, the problems become more difficult of resolution. For,
surely, the Freedom Clause does not, without more, convey an immunity
from all civil laws on those who claim that the breach of them may be attrib-
uted to their religious beliefs. So far as I know, no Supreme Court Justice
has opted for such an absolutist position as Mr. Justice Black did with refer-
ence to the Free Speech and Press Clauses.56
The Court's behavior in what it labels freedom of religion cases might be
compared with the ancient royal prerogative of dispensation, pursuant to
which the Crown could exempt individuals from conforming to the laws of
Parliament, particularly for reasons of religious activity. Charles I invoked
the prerogative on behalf of Catholic allies and lost his head for it; Charles II
did the same and lost his throne. The English Bill of Rights deprived the
Crown of such authority in 1689. The administration of the freedom clause
by the Court often seems no less arbitrary than the exercise of the royal
prerogative of dispensation.
The most important of the Burger Court Freedom Clause cases, Wisconsin
v. Yoder, 7 was written by the Chief Justice. He invalidated the Wisconsin
compulsory education law requiring the Amish to send their children to
high schools after completion of grammar school. The opinion, while long,
was narrow. It was composed in the same spirit of church-state cooperation
that marked his Walz tax exemption opinion. The Amish were held to have
53. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 639.
54. Id.
55. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 11 (1948).
56. See, e.g., Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36 (1961).
57. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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earned their dispensation from compliance with the law by their "goodness,"
by their long history of abstention from worldly affairs, and by their consid-
ered judgment that they and their children would be better off if unschooled.
Sophistication was anathema to their way of life. But the Chief Justice made
it clear that Johnny-come-lately sects, less than three centuries old, could
not expect to have their arguments, however similar to those of the Old
Amish, given credence against the state's requirement of high-school
education.
On the other hand, not even the Amish could be excused from paying
social security taxes because it violated their faith to do so.5" Furthermore, a
state may not disqualify clergymen from legislative office, although such dis-
qualifications had a long history both in English law and in early American
law. 9
Then, too, although Jehovah's Witnesses were once given protection of
their rights to distribute religious literature, even when invading private
premises, on the ground that such distribution was part of their religious
obligations,"° Krishnas, on the other hand, may be confined to booths at a
state fair because other purveyors of nonreligious literature were equally
confined.6 1 A Jehovah's Witness who voluntarily quit his job in a plant pro-
ducing war materials could not be denied workmen's compensation,
although others who quit for personal reasons may be denied such benefits.
62
But a conscientious objector who did alternative service was not entitled to
the governmental benefits available to other military draftees and enlistees. 3
And so it has gone. Which way the fleas will jump is difficult to predict.
Certainly it is not according to any discernible pattern.
More important than the Court's cavalier treatment of principles and
precedents, however, is the fact that the Court seems to have lost its ear for
that fine but important distinction between religious freedom and religious
tolerance, between majority rule and minority rights, between the primacy of
the individual and that of the collective, between the American version of
proper church-state relationships and that which was brought from Europe
before the founding of this new nation. The distinction is to be found in the
concept that all religions, like all individuals, are equal before the law. The
rule of law commands that equality is best achieved by the government's
total abstention from religious affairs, from those matters that are the con-
58. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
59. McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978).
60. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
61. Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1981).
62. Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
63. Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361 (1974).
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cern only of each individual and his church and his God. No person, no
church shall have precedence in law because of religious beliefs or affilia-
tions; no person, no church shall be subordinated because of religious beliefs
or affiliations. Any religion that needs government to succor it, to persuade
or compel adherence to religious faith, is not likely to survive, except as a
mere tool of government. We have come too far down the road of history
not to realize that the principal danger to freedom is not the threat to gov-
ernment from the individual but the threat to the individual from
government.
The sphere of American constitutional government and American religion
are distinct. If a heretic may say so, the survival of American religion de-
pends on the maintenance of the spirit of love-or at least that is one of the
things I thought I had learned from Pope John XXIII. The survival of
American constitutional government depends on the maintenance of the
spirit of liberty. The phrase, "the spirit of liberty," I take from Learned
Hand, and I would conclude these remarks by offering his understanding of
its meaning:
The spirit of liberty is the spirit which is not too sure that it is
right; the spirit of liberty is the spirit which seeks to understand the
minds of other men and women; the spirit of liberty is the spirit
which weighs their interests alongside its own without bias; the
spirit of liberty remembers that not even a sparrow falls to earth
unheeded; the spirit of liberty is the spirit of Him who, near two
thousand years ago, taught mankind the lesson it has never
learned, but has never quite forgotten; that there may be a king-
dom where the least shall be heard and considered side by side
with the greatest.' 4
64. L. HAND, The Spirit of Liberty, in THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 144 (1959).
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